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The Shape of Things

THE OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUES FROM MOSCOW and Berlin effectively conceal the progress of the fighting on the Russian front, and there are no neutral reports, even censored, against which to check them. The Germans claim to have closed their pincers in the neighborhood of Minsk, thus cutting off from 300,000 to 500,000 Soviet soldiers in Russian Poland. But how many men does Germany require to "surround" an enemy of such strength? And is it certain that this huge Russian force is incapable of "pinching the pincers" in the manner described by Alexander Kiralfy in his article on page 11? Whatever the outcome of the battle which sways bloodily but obscurely along Europe's eastern marches, whether the Red Army collapses, or retreats slowly and intact, or successfully achieves the counter-offensive—whatever the outcome, we must not forget that this is but one campaign in a worldwide struggle. Undoubtedly Hitler expects a quick success which will enable him to turn with overwhelming effect against Britain. Meanwhile, he is willing to take the risk of giving the West a breathing-spell, assuming, perhaps, that neither the British nor ourselves will be able to take advantage of it. The British are doing their best to prove this assumption false by putting on a tremendous air offensive, but in this country there seems a tendency to relax. Only by such uncompromising action as Secretary Knox advocates—the use of the navy to "clear the Atlantic" for the safe delivery of war supplies—can the United States make effective use of the chance offered by Hitler's engagement in the east. That such action means war, declared or undeclared, no honest man would deny. But so did the famous raid on the Barbary pirates.

*

FRIENDS OF THE FINNISH AND SWEDISH peoples must speak out against the actions of their governments in cooperating with the Nazis. The Finns, at least, have some excuse. They were wantonly attacked by Russia in 1939 and suffered severe loss of territory. Perhaps they could hardly be expected to forgo this opportunity for revenge, especially since their geographical

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situation left them little chance of remaining neutral when their two monster neighbors fell out. But the Finnish government's claim that it only declared war after many attacks by Soviet bombers will not bear examination. It could hardly expect immunity after permitting large numbers of German troops to enter the country and after Hitler's proclamation of war against Russia had spoken specifically of operations based on Finland. The Swedish government, in explaining the transit privileges granted to a German division passing from Norway to Finland, entered pleas that are even feebler. It declared that this concession was justified by "its special attitude toward Finland," but it is noteworthy that Sweden's close ties with Norway did not prevent a strictly neutral stand when that country was ravished. A more candid explanation has been given by Premier Albin Hansson, who declared that his government, after many hesitations, yielded to heavy German pressure. If Sweden is ever to make good its boast that it is prepared and ready to resist all violations of its independence and neutral rights, it had better stop its retreat under threats now, while the Nazis are heavily engaged east and west. Otherwise it will soon find itself taking that last step backward into the abyss of the "New European Order."

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JAPAN'S POSITION IN THE WAR CONTINUES to provoke widespread speculation in this country. Some observers, particularly those urging a continuation of our appeasement policies, profess to see a weakening in Japan's ties to the Axis as a result of the Nazi-Soviet war. In an effort to encourage this view, Premier Konoye declares that he sees no reason why the United States and Japan cannot remain friendly. But if Japan is hesitant, it should be obvious that it is not because of the recent tendency toward appeasement in Washington. Japan's plans for expansion toward the south were blocked by the firm attitude of the authorities of the Netherlands East Indies; and it hesitates to attack Siberia more out of fear of Soviet bombers than out of gratitude for continued shipments of American oil and other essential war supplies. The appeasers argue that we should do nothing to provoke Japan at this moment lest it enter the war on the side of the Axis. Actually, there is but one thing that will bring Japan into the war in the near future—the collapse of the Soviet defenses. Japan can probably be kept out altogether if an understanding can be worked out between the United States and the Soviets regarding naval and air bases along the Siberian coast. The United States blocked Japanese expansion in this area after the last war. It should do so again today.

*

THE ALUMINUM CRISIS HAS FINALLY BEEN brought into the open by reports of the Truman committee of the Senate and the House Military Committee. It is now admitted, as *The Nation* has charged repeatedly in the last six months, that aluminum production is grossly inadequate for defense needs. The shortage is said largely to account for the recent falling off in the output of military aircraft, and it threatens to curtail plane production next year by at least 25 per cent. Responsibility for the shortage falls squarely on the shoulders of the OPM, which has consistently underestimated the amount of raw materials required by the defense program. The Truman committee attributes the OPM's error to the fact that it relied for its estimates on the Aluminum Company of America, which, as monopoly producer, has had an interest in discouraging the building of new plants. Shocked out of its apathy by these Congressional disclosures, the OPM has announced a plan to build eight new aluminum plants with a total annual capacity of 600,000,000 pounds. These, together with increased imports from Canada, should eventually give us an annual production of 1,600,000,000 pounds—the estimated requirement for 1942. This estimate of needs, however, is based on current production plans and makes no allowance for the inevitable increases in bomber requirements during the next eighteen months. Should we be drawn into the war, a new and even more critical aluminum shortage would almost certainly develop unless production is increased more than is now even contemplated.

*

THE OPM'S RECORD OF UNDERESTIMATING defense needs has led to a belated and much-needed shake-up in personnel. Gano Dunn, who was responsible for a particularly bad guess on steel requirements, has returned to his job as head of the J. G. White Engineering Company. C. W. Kellogg, who had to be reprimanded for declaring that our electric-power facilities were adequate for the defense emergency, has gone back to his desk as head of the Edison Electric Institute, the trade association of the power industry. Another industrialist, Samuel R. Fuller, has resigned as chief of the raw-materials division to return to the presidency of the North American Rayon Corporation. In explaining his resignation, Mr. Kellogg declared that he had been told that the OPM had adopted a policy of excluding the active heads of trade associations from responsible posts. Such a policy, which is clearly justified by the facts recorded above, would presumably compel the resignation of such advisers as Walter S. Tower, president of the American Iron and Steel Institute, W. L. Finger, head of the Rubber Manufacturers' Association, and C. W. Boyce, who is connected with the Paper and Pulp Trade Association. That capable men without ties with private industry can be found is indicated by the appointment of J. A. Krug, TVA power manager, to succeed Mr. Kellogg as power consultant. Mr. Krug takes the realistic position that it is far better to have too much power than too little. That goes for all other essentials of defense.

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A FORMAL ORDER BY PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT barring discrimination against Negroes and other minority groups in defense industries is an important move in defense of democracy. The order is to be implemented by a committee set up in the Office of Production Management, which will receive and investigate complaints and take "appropriate steps to redress grievances which it finds to be valid." As Mr. Roosevelt said in an earlier statement, "No nation combating the increasing threat of totalitarianism can afford arbitrarily to exclude large segments of its population from its defense industries. Even more important is it for us to strengthen our unity and morale by refuting at home the very theories which we are fighting abroad." The fact that an order against discrimination was necessary is a wry commentary on the weaknesses of our democracy. We hope that the President's little emancipation proclamation will be vigorously enforced.

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THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S RULING THAT refugees who have close relatives in Germany or German-occupied territories may not enter the United States is explained as an effort to prevent Nazi agents from flooding this country. Instructions to consuls under this order refer to "the increasing number of instances known to the department where persons leaving certain countries in Europe have been permitted to leave only after entering into an obligation to act as agents in the United States for the governments controlling the countries from which they desired to depart. . . ." Clear enough, if a bit wordy. The consuls are specifically instructed "to withhold visas in all cases in which the visa applicant has children, parents, spouse, brothers, or sisters still remaining in such territory." Later the department issued an "explanation" designed to meet the barrage of protest with which this ruling was greeted. It explained nothing, merely substituting confusion for clarity. To get at the facts behind this order, we should like to ask the State Department a few questions: How many instances of such bargains as you describe in your "instructions" are actually on file in the department? If the number is not great, do you believe it to be sound administrative practice to subject thousands of innocent persons to danger and suffering in order to keep out a few potential Nazi tools? We have inquired of several important agencies dealing with refugees and have been told that *not a single case* of the sort of subversive action against which the new ruling is directed has ever come to their attention. Until we hear of at least one, from the State Department or elsewhere, we shall continue to suspect that the ruling represents a ruthless determination to bar as many victims of Hitler's terror as can possibly be covered by the least plausible excuse. If only the department had thought of this earlier, it could have shut out Thomas Mann and Einstein.

"WHEN THE GERMAN FORCES CROSSED THE Bug River," reads a dispatch from Berlin to the New York *Times,* "the Russians appear to have allowed them to advance without giving any indication of their presence. Then they opened a 'devastating' fire from all sides upon the German advance units. Such methods of warfare are scathingly criticized in the *Völkischer Beobachter,* which declares that shooting from the rear is a typical bolshevist action." Even the Russians should know that under the protocol of the New Order it is not cricket to take advantage of a blitzkrieg with its panzers down.

Showdown on Prices

THE next few weeks should show whether the spiral of rising prices can be checked by administrative control, or whether we are headed for a period of wartime inflation such as the country experienced from 1916 to 1919. It is evident that Federal Price Administrator Henderson has gone about as far as he can on the basis of voluntary cooperation. His effort to force the automobile industry to rescind the price increases posted for July 1 has been sharply challenged by the Chrysler Corporation, and in consequence Mr. Henderson has permitted the Packard Motor Company, the Studebaker Corporation, the Hudson Motor Car Company, and the Nash-Kelvinator Corporation to boost their prices. Several furniture companies have announced an additional 5 per cent increase in prices in the face of Mr. Henderson's protest against a general 5 to 10 per cent increase announced a few days earlier. Although the tire manufacturers have shown a disposition to go along with the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply (OPACS), such cooperation may not continue if other industries successfully defy Mr. Henderson's efforts.

Scarcity resulting from production controls will complicate the problem. With the 1942 automobile models scheduled to appear early in August on a restricted basis, further price increases appear inevitable unless Mr. Henderson gets authority from Congress to enforce his orders. It is understood that the President will send a message to Congress within the next week or ten days asking for such authority. Passage of legislation granting this power is, of course, essential. But enactment of a price-control law with teeth in it will only mark the beginning of Mr. Henderson's troubles. For the price spiral has already advanced to such a stage that it is impossible to bring it to a complete halt overnight. Any effort to freeze all prices as of, say, July 1 might lead either to a curtailment in production or a reduction in quality despite all efforts of the administration to prevent such a development. Some further price increases will have to be permitted in order to assure supplies of raw materials for the defense industries. Wages are undoubtedly an im-

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portant item in the cost of production, but it would be most unwise to attempt to freeze wages at their present level when the cost of living has already risen 2½ per cent and most workers have received no increases. Holding retail prices at their present level will also present a serious problem in the face of a much greater increase in wholesale prices. It will be doubly difficult where scarcity exists—as in automobiles and tires, eggs and dairy products—as a result of the defense program or lend-lease operations. In such instances, the OPACS will have a choice between permitting further price increases as a means of curtailing consumption and imposing direct restrictions on consumer buying.

All these difficulties can theoretically be overcome if control measures are rigorously enforced. Mr. Henderson has served warning that he intends to leave no stone unturned in the effort to prevent a disastrous inflation, but it is clear that no man or agency can do the job without the sympathetic cooperation of the entire country. The OPACS will have to be arbitrary in many of its actions. It will have to crack down not only on industry but on the wholesale and retail trade and on agriculture. If wage rates are not to be frozen, arbitrary allowances will have to be made for wage changes in establishing price ceilings. The job is filled with political dynamite, as may be seen from the way the huge farm-subsidy bill was forced through Congress despite its disastrous effect on the price structure. Yet action must be taken quickly before the price spiral gets completely out of hand. No one except a few speculators and profiteers wants runaway prices such as we had in the last war. But the same forces are at work, and they can only be stopped if Mr. Henderson gets the power he requires.



With the Greatest of Ease

Hitler's Political Front

BY FREDA KIRCHWEY

IN LAUNCHING his unprovoked and unannounced attack on the Soviet Union Hitler saw a chance to mobilize the anti-Communist sentiment of the whole world. In 1939 he had forfeited a large proportion of that support and counted its loss less important than the material and strategic benefits gained by neutralizing Russia in the early stages of the war. He did his best to counteract the loss. Abandoning perforce the old theme of Communist menace, he appealed to the masses by attacking the imperialist warmongering of the "pluto-democracies." But this string always gave off a sour sound: the Nazis had allowed it to get limp and out of tune through years of disuse. And it rang particularly false when it was twanged by the Communists themselves. The real enemies of pluto-democracy in the democratic countries listened with a wry face. No one was taken in by it, least of all perhaps the Stalinists, of whom only the more brazen did their prescribed lying with the cynical assurance of professionals.

As Hitler himself has confessed, the Russian alliance was an uncomfortable affair, and he was relieved when strategic considerations made it possible for him to drop it. He had done a thriving business in anti-communism for years and he was glad to be back at the old stand.

This is not to be taken, however, as proof that Russia was faithless to its pact; Moscow has solemnly denied Hitler's charges of hostile acts and treaty violations, and as Louis Fischer points out on another page, Stalin was willing to make concessions up to the very hour of invasion, as Daladier and Chamberlain were in 1939. Hitler's discomfort arose not from the behavior of his Russian bedfellow but from the attitude of his other neighbors. Even Franco had dared reveal disappointment when the mighty backer of his own little anti-Communist crusade came to terms with the enemy of all Christendom. And Japan, which had joined the anti-Comintern pact in order to be relieved of its haunting fear of Russian attack while pursuing its dark purposes in China, felt thoroughly betrayed. The Soviet specter followed every Nazi move, creating uneasiness or outright hostility among the reactionaries who are Hitler's natural allies and apologists.

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Today they flock, with only a little prodding from Berlin, to join the old front so happily reconstituted. "Token" "volunteer" contingents come from Franco Spain, from Italy, from all the Balkans, even from the conquered countries and Sweden; with their slogans and their guns the fascist foreign legions move up to the Soviet frontier.

These are Hitler's political troops, useful for no other purpose than to rouse and dramatize the fear of communism, so effective in the past, for the disruption of anti-Nazi unity. The front in this political battle is far longer than the vast eastern line; it extends around the world.

Hitler knows he has no chance today of scaring Britain out of the war. But he still has jobs to do in England. There are appeasers left, infected with the old hope of "turning the war east," who will look upon the Russian struggle as at least a welcome respite for England. They may not dare to talk openly of peace, but they will try to spread a mood of relaxation—a wait-and-see psychology. There are the out-and-out reactionaries, who surely shudder at the spectacle of Britain allying itself with Russia while Germany leads a great international anti-Communist drive.

But Hitler's real hope does not lie in Britain. His hope of softening, dividing, confusing, prying wider the social fissures ready-made in all democratic societies, galvanizing the pro-Axis sentiment in weak and wavering dictatorships—this hope is directed chiefly at Vichy and Rome and Madrid and, most of all, the New World.

So far the clearest response has come from Spain, where the Phalangists shout for Russia's annihilation and organize an expeditionary force for the march on Moscow. Suñer's Falange can count today on those clerical reactionaries whose hatred for Russia has in the past tempered their natural enthusiasm for fascism.

This element also has weighty influence in Latin America, a fact Hitler must carefully have considered in planning his new holy war. Organized and spread by Phalangist groups, the anti-Communist crusade will provide a welcome rallying-point in Catholic circles in the Spanish-speaking countries, although the pointed failure of Pope Pius to mention Russia in his speech last Monday may serve to dampen their fascist ardors.

In the United States pro-Nazi groups, religious or plain reactionary, will of course flock to the anti-Communist standard with pleasure and relief. But it is not these well-defined enemies of democracy—the Coughlinites and Bundists and native fascists—that Hitler hopes to reach. They swallowed Russia without obvious gagging and belong safely in his camp. Hitler has his eye on the main stream of American opinion. He hopes to divide it and draw off enough of its strength to slow down the tempo of our war effort. It isn't necessary to win friends in order to influence people; it is necessary only to direct their attention to another potential enemy.

How well has the maneuver worked? It is too early to know, but it is clear at least that American isolationists and pacifists are doing their best to act as Berlin intended them to. The America First Committee headed a pronouncement published after the Nazi attack on Russia, "No Red Allies for the United States." It went on to raise the bolshevik bogy in language that might have been dictated by Goebbels. Mr. Dies prophesies a tremendous increase in the influence of the Communist Party in America. Senator Wheeler says he doesn't think "the American people will stand for us to tie up with the Communists. . . . Now we can just let Joe Stalin and the other dictators fight it out." Our other isolationists, including the ponderous and portentous Mr. Hoover, run true to this set form, accepting gratefully the new propaganda material from Berlin without bothering to look at the label.

A genuine danger exists that Hitler will be able to accomplish his immediate aims in America. The entrance of Russia into the war may slow up America's progress toward effective aid to Britain. Communism is an unpopular nostrum in this country—even more unpopular among those who have supported the struggle against Hitler than among the isolationists and pacifists whom the Communists have abetted in their efforts to spread defeatism and hamstring defense. And the conversion of the Communist Party, now that Russia is fighting, is likely to create more contempt than sympathy.

But intelligent anti-fascists will not permit their dislike of the Communists to play into Hitler's hands. The discovery of the Communist Party that the war is no longer an imperialist struggle will have some happy by-products. Deliberate sabotage of defense will almost certainly stop; intrigues in the trade unions may not be called off but at least they will not be directed against the war-production program; the many bothersome little anti-war demonstrations and mobilizations will come to an end.

Since the only important job in hand is the struggle against Nazism, we shall do far better to accept for what they are worth the incidental benefits that flow from the new party line and not worry about its lack of honesty or logic. To concentrate on the mental contortions of the comrades is to follow a course laid out for us by Hitler. We who know he must be defeated, whether Russia is his enemy or his ally, cannot afford to fall in with his plans. We, of all people, cannot allow ourselves to be frightened into inaction by Hitler's *old* party line—the threat of communism. With Nazi armies in seventeen once-free countries and Russia invaded, the alarm voiced by Hitler's innocents and fellow-travelers in this country sounds like the fantasy of madmen. The one serious issue today is the defeat of Hitler. Americans who keep this steadily in mind will be impregnably defended against the political attack launched last week from Berlin.

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Did Stalin Want War?

BY LOUIS FISCHER

I UNDERSTAND that the German government submitted no demands to the Soviet government prior to the opening of the Soviet-Nazi war. For a fortnight before the outbreak of hostilities no important diplomatic exchanges or conversations took place between Berlin and Moscow. This fact is crucial in an interpretation of Hitler's plans. He asked nothing of Stalin because he did not want to give the Kremlin a chance to capitulate. Hitler proposes to march to Moscow, oust the Soviet government, set up a puppet Russian government, and thus eliminate Russia from the larger war situation.

One principle of strategy has dominated Germany's entire conduct of this war: never fight on two fronts. The Kaiser lost because he had fought on two fronts. Hitler, therefore, is the great isolationist; he isolates his enemies and smashes them one by one. He isolated Poland and defeated it while he kept other fronts passive. He played the same game in Scandinavia, the Lowlands and France, and the Balkans. Greece and Crete having been taken, Turkey was isolated and forced to convert its Soviet alliance into pro-German neutrality. That isolated Russia.

The war on Russia is not primarily a matter of supplies. Hitler hopes to get the supplies. But more important is his desire to knock out Russia before America's threatened emergence as the decisive factor in the war. If Hitler could decisively defeat the Soviet armed forces and seize the territories in western and southern Russia without whose natural wealth and industries those forces could never recuperate completely, he could say to Great Britain and America: "I have the Continent and its wealth. You cannot destroy me. Let us, accordingly, talk peace." Hitler's real purpose in striking at Russia was to force a negotiated peace on terms favorable to him by forever eliminating the possibility of an eastern front.

Hitler did not march into Russia because no risks were involved. He did it because, even if he possessed sufficient strength to invade England, he could not safely venture across the English Channel while there was an independent Russia which could stab Germany in the back.

Recent Soviet-Nazi relations have traced a zigzag. The pact of August 23, 1939, inaugurated a period of land grabbing, Soviet deliveries of materials to Germany, and Soviet protestations of "good-neighborly friendship." When France fell so suddenly, Moscow was frightened. But Hitler's failure to beat down England in the air blitz of September, 1940, encouraged Stalin: Germany would still be occupied in the west.

In November, 1940, Prime Minister Molotov interviewed Hitler in Berlin. Therewith began a deterioration of the "friendship." Molotov revealed Soviet designs on Finland and the Balkans. In June, 1940, while Germany was busy in France, the Red Army had seized Bessarabia and more than its agreed share of Bukovina. Hitler thereupon gave a guaranty to Rumania. Then Molotov wished to guarantee Bulgaria and to acquire bases on the Dardanelles. Hitler said so on the day he launched the war on Russia. The Turks declare that Molotov demanded the same bases when Foreign Minister Saracoglu visited Moscow in the autumn of 1940.

Hitler could not move into the Balkans during the winter. But when spring came he "coordinated" Bulgaria and Rumania and prepared to embrace Yugoslavia. On March 27, 1941, General Simovich staged a coup in Belgrade against the pro-Nazi Yugoslav government that had submitted to Hitler. The Simovich coup was British-made, but it pleased the Russians, and they showed their sympathy openly. This marked the peak of undisguised Soviet hostility toward Germany. Moscow hoped that Nazi strength would be diverted away from Russia by the Balkan fighting.

But Yugoslavia and Greece succumbed sooner than had been expected. The moment Yugoslavia collapsed, the Bolsheviks believed Hitler would attack them, and on April 9 the Moscow daily the *Red Star* warned that since the invasion of England was off, the burden of the war would be transferred from west to east, that is, against Russia. In their peril they sought to return to Hitler's good graces by evidence of good conduct. The withdrawal of diplomatic privileges from the Belgian, Norwegian, and Yugoslav ministers in Moscow was ordered on May 9. The Soviet government recognized the anti-British rebel of Bagdad. But Hitler was determined to fight Russia, and beginning April 12, according to Assistant Soviet Foreign Commissar Lozovsky, the Germans made numerous reconnaissance flights over Soviet territory.

For several weeks before the beginning of the Soviet-Nazi war, Sir Stafford Cripps, the British ambassador in Moscow, was cold-shouldered by the Soviet authorities. They refused to receive him, and he in his turn avoided contact with them. Moscow was flat on its belly before Hitler. Finally Cripps gave the whole thing up as a bad bet and flew to England. Moscow's behavior had convinced him that Stalin would sell out to Hitler. But Hitler did not want a sell-out. He wanted to crush Soviet Russia.

While the grim battle proceeds, the diplomatic barrage is not without a touch of humor. The other day Lozovsky told the foreign newspaper correspondents in Moscow that the Soviet government now understood that "a non-aggression pact is the careful preparation of aggression." What a remarkable discovery! A hundred journalists wrote that after August 23, 1939. And Maxim Litvinov said it in ten speeches before August 23, 1939.

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The Fourth Estate at Detroit

BY JAMES A. WECHSLER

Detroit, June 28

THERE was a Newspaper Guild convention some years ago at which Heywood Broun kept a neatly filled glass of gin on the speakers' table, and when one of the titled guest orators paused for a drink of water after sounding a high note he took a huge gulp out of Broun's glass. It was a tense moment in Guild history; but the Guild survived. This week, at its eighth convention, the union Broun nurtured faced a crisis which Emily Post couldn't handle. The 170 delegates, sober and weary, met in an atmosphere that few had foreseen: not only was it the first convention of a C. I. O. union since the North American Aviation Company strike; the delegates gathered only a few hours after the Hitler-Stalin romance blew up, creating what the Communist press calls "a new situation."

The latter event had at least one salutary effect: because of the ensuing confusion among the passengers on the locomotive of history, the convention was spared any righteous rhetoric condemning the "imperialist war" and any addresses praising the neutrality practiced by the great white father and spurned by That Man in Washington. If President Roosevelt, as some Guild leaders had been suggesting, was still labor's foremost foe, the point was amiably skipped. The new upheaval, however, did not smother the dissension which has been smoldering so long in the Guild. While what one delegate called the "biennial flip-flop" eliminated some areas of dispute, there was no apparent disposition on either side to make pretty faces.

In fact, this convention represented the high-water mark of opposition to the Guild leadership, which has long been accused of following the Communist Party line. On each of the test votes supporters of the administration won, but the margin of victory was so narrow that every vote counted; this fear of being absent at a critical roll call virtually wrecked the delegates' social life. The truth is that the Guild is deeply divided, and the meeting dramatized the cleavage. When Vice-President Milton Kaufman asked a vote of confidence after it had been charged that he was a Communist Party member, he got it by a score of 90⅔ to 80⅓; his stand on the North American strike, which he blessed after R. J. Thomas, president of the automobile workers' union, had blasted it, was sustained by a similar vote; so was the Guild leadership's insistence that the *Guild Reporter* was innocent of any bias in intra-union disputes. But in each of these battles, waged in sizzling temperature with no regard for overtime, the administration owed its triumphs to the thirty-four solid votes of the New York contingent, cast with the monolithic monotony of the famous "twenty-four votes for Underwood."

Though defeated on nearly every roll call, the insurgents went home happy about the outcome: while they lost the ideological debates, they won the point they have labored hardest for—direct election of officers by mailed vote of the membership. Heretofore Guild functionaries have been designated by the convention, with New York invariably holding the balance of power, and everybody thought the proposal of a change would arouse hot dispute. Early in the proceedings, however, the pro-administration caucus abruptly conceded the point, insisting only that the present officers stay on the job until the votes are in. The opposition foolishly contested this plea, which has obvious organizational validity, and took its hardest spanking of the convention.

With direct elections authorized, the session lost much of its immediate significance. It simply drew the battle lines for an election campaign which may be a preview of things to come in other unions identified with the party-line bloc in the C. I. O. Because of the new election procedure, the insurgents are conceded a favorable chance even by their foes; as on the Youngstown resolution condemning all 'isms, the ballots will reach a good many Guildsmen who have been staying out of the fracas.

The opposition's attempt to prove that Milton Kaufman is a Communist Party member did not sweep this reporter off his feet; and it indicated how the insurgents may snatch defeat out of the jaws of victory in the coming campaign. One witness is not a case, and half-supported charges are worse than none at all. It would have been more impressive, many delegates believed, if the oppositionists had confined their remarks to the obvious, demonstrable facts that key Guild leaders have been steadily nodding agreement with *Daily Worker* editorials —both yesterday's and today's; that they have systematically praised the efforts of those groups which the Communist Party deems "progressive"; that in the current strike on the *Jewish Day* they have bestowed a disproportionate amount of their abuse on Messrs. Hillman and Dubinsky, social-democratic demons prior to June 22, 1941; that while this orthodoxy may or may not be coincidence, it has seriously hampered the Guild's growth.

Supporters of the Guild leadership have long contended that the opposition attack, now mounting to a climax in the election drive, makes good copy for *Editor*

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and Publisher. It does. There will also be an attempt by conservatives to take over the opposition bloc. All these are risks which the insurgents must face; certainly a victory at the polls which led to collapse on the bargaining front would be disastrous—for both the Guild and other unions in the throes of the same struggle. But the alternative to a clear-cut showdown, it was contended here, is stagnation and retreat. It is a matter of record that Guild progress among editorial workers has virtually reached a standstill; and this fact intensifies the conflict between writers and commercial employees.

Pro-administration spokesmen at the convention frequently suggested that the opposition show was being run by "publishers' stooges"; this charge will undoubtedly sway some Guildsmen who respect the zeal and past achievements of the Guild leadership. It should therefore be recorded here that I heard no sentiment voiced in opposition circles for more wage cuts and less C. I. O.; nor was the opposition caucus packed with Roy Howard's valets or Westbrook Pegler's copy boys.

Crisis and Confusion

BY NORMAN ANGELL

IT IS becoming clearer every day that the outcome of this war will depend not on what America does but on whether it does it in time. Nearly all military commentators agree that the totalitarian powers have won their victories, in the last analysis, by acting more quickly than their victims; by seizing and keeping the initiative, not only on the actual battlefields, but also in the equally vital spheres of politics and diplomacy. And this is true, of course, not merely of the events of the past twenty months but of those of the past ten years. If certain steps now being undertaken with immense difficulty—for example, aid to China—had been adopted a few years ago, when they would have involved far fewer risks, it is extremely probable that war in Europe would have been prevented.

Looking back over the errors which made the years of appeasement possible in Britain, one sees that they were due to precisely the same confusions as those that are being exploited in America today. The same verbal traps as are now employed to ensnare a sincere but often vague public were constantly sprung in Britain during those years; the same deceptive slogans ran amuck; the same intellectual dishonesties were prevalent. Because the parallel is so striking—and disturbing—it is worth while to list and clarify some of the more disastrous instances of this muddled thinking.

Back in 1931, when it was urged upon the British government that in the interest of Britain's security, if for no other reason, China should be helped effectively in its resistance to Japan, the government was able to silence all such demands by the question: Do you want to drag the country into war by intervening in a "distant quarrel on the other side of the world in which we are not concerned" (Sir John Simon's words)? Persons who advocated aid to China were "warmongers," willing to "plunge the country into war, when 90 per cent of the people want peace." Were the warmongers prepared, asked the appeasers, to submit the simple issue of peace or war to the people? And so on, and so on.

The appeasers got away with this forensic dishonesty because of one primary confusion in the mind of the public, one fundamental failure of clarification. It was not true that 90 per cent of the people wanted peace before everything. Not 1 per cent of the people did. If British territory, even British territory on the other side of the world, in Australia, say, had been invaded, 99 per cent of the people would have clamored for war, war for defense. They did not want peace, they wanted peaceful defense, which is something entirely different; it is a desire in which peace does not come first and in which defense does. If it had been clear that China's defense really was part of Britain's defense, the people would have seen that the objection about "plunging into war" was equivalent to saying, "We will defend our country unless it means war"; something not 10 per cent, perhaps not 1 per cent, were prepared to say.

This same fundamental confusion prevailed three years later when action against Italian aggression in Ethiopia was frustrated. Large sections of the public were in favor of stopping Mussolini if it could be done "short of war," by economic sanctions. The government, thereupon, invented a slogan, "Sanctions mean war." (Someone at the time remarked, "Defense means war," unless your intention to fight is so clear that it halts the aggressor before war is provoked.) The provision that sanctions were to be "short of war," of course, gave the control of sanctions, and of British policy, to Mussolini. He had only to say, "Impose this or that or the other sanction and I will fight," to make the "short-of-war" provision a means of rendering sanctions inoperative. Winston Churchill summed up the situation thus: "The government tells us that sanctions mean war; they promise they will do nothing which might lead the country into war; and that their policy is sanctions."

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In every one of the pre-war British retreats, by which the whole defensive position of the country was steadily undermined, the people failed to see that the fundamental question was: Shall we, when it comes to the sticking-point, fight for defense, go to war, rather than place ourselves in such a position as Czechoslovakia's, in which we should have to surrender because fighting would be patently useless? If they had seen this clearly, the vast majority of the people would have said, as they did say after the Czech bastion was irretrievably lost, "Of course we shall fight, not merely when the enemy lands on our soil, but when he threatens positions which if taken by him will make fighting on our part ineffective." If the question of checking the growth of aggression had been discussed in these terms, the whole debate would have been shifted from the meaningless issue of whether the country was in favor of war or peace to the issue of whether a particular policy, even if it did involve risk of war, was indispensable to defense.

Similarly, if Britain's survival for a year or two is in fact indispensable to American defense, there is no more justification for leveling the charge of warmonger at the interventionists than there would be for hurling the same epithet at those who want to build fortifications along the American coasts. And if defense of the British outpost really is part of American defense, the slogan "aid to Britain short of war" is, again, precisely equivalent to saying, "We will defend America unless it means fighting."

The importance of all this lies in the bearing of these confusions of thought on the time element in action. For some years previous to the war British critics of Mr. Chamberlain's policy had been saying to him, "At some point in this totalitarian advance and encirclement you will have to make a stand; the very public which is now so hesitant will compel you to do so, possibly at a very dangerous point." And, in reply, supporters of Mr. Chamberlain kept on saying, "It is not practical politics to assume that public opinion would ever sanction our fighting for Danzig or for Poland." Yet just as soon as the Hitlerian advance actually reached Prague, the public began to demand the very policy it had so recently condemned. It is worth noting in this connection that on the day after Hitler's occupation of Prague Sir John Simon in the House of Commons, speaking on behalf of the government, declared that even that would make no difference in British policy. Forty-eight hours later Mr. Chamberlain was making the speech in which, by pledging British support of Poland if Poland were invaded, he completely reversed British policy. He knew that opinion was on the move and would stand for no more retreating before Hitler.

The truth is that very often "the public" does not know how it will feel in a situation which has not yet arisen. It must wait until the course of events has brought home the real nature of certain forces which beforehand are only half understood. It ought not to be beyond the wit of democratic leaders, or the capacity of our educational processes, to accelerate that understanding. Had the British public realized that there would inevitably come a point when certain moral instincts, as well as political interests, would compel a stand against the totalitarian advance, then that stand would have been made much earlier, when the risk was less and when it might have prevented war altogether.

One fact which the British public ignored when, in the hope presumably that "this time would be the last," it acquiesced so repeatedly in the retreats before totalitarian aggression was the fact that aggression of the fascist brand cannot stop of its own volition, that it must be opposed by equivalent force or it will go on, that it is not a matter of Hitler's free choice or "intentions" at all, but of the nature of the forces which he has set in motion. That truth has a tragic application to America, where sections of opinion still fail, as so much of British opinion failed, to take in the full significance of a situation the country may be called upon to face.

Consider the position of America if Britain were defeated, its ports destroyed and captured, and London occupied by Nazi forces, as Paris is now occupied. Hitler could not possibly stop at the mere conquest of the British Isles. He would have to go on to assure his command of the sea, to assure his control of that sea power which is still so potent a world force, though its instruments are today not ships alone but ships supported by aircraft. Hitler would have to make sure that the command of the sea, which Britain had held for so long, did not pass to the United States; for if it did, none of his immense conquests would be secure. Hitler has read the history of Napoleon, that earlier master of Europe. He knows that Napoleon, as Admiral Mahan showed, was not conquered finally by great armies on the Continent but by "those storm-tossed ships that Napoleon never saw." To allow sea and air command to pass to the Western Hemisphere, and to remain there as a constant threat to his political and economic reorganization of Europe, would from Hitler's point of view be crass and inexcusable stupidity, especially when he could make sure of firmly establishing his sea command, probably without firing a shot, by means of an adaptation—which will be indicated in a moment—of that type of blackmail of which he has shown himself such a master.

Once Hitler has conquered Britain, he will have established himself at the center of an empire which, with the French, Dutch, and Belgian empires, will include the whole of Africa, the whole of India, the greater part of the Near East, strong strategic positions in the Far East, sources of rubber, oil, tin, and other raw materials, Australia, New Zealand, and many Pacific islands. Without sea power—and dominant sea power—he cannot possi-

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bly be sure of holding this world-encircling domain; and if any considerable part of it, with its strategic points, should fall into the hands of others, even his control over his European domain might be threatened. Hitler is haunted, as we know, by the possibility of a repetition of the experience of 1914-18, when a temporary combination of powers, which included the United States, imposed defeat and humiliation upon Germany. It may be said that the whole purpose of Hitler's crusade, his first and last objective, is to put Germany in such a position that it can never again be confronted by a similar hostile combination. There is, in the German philosophy, only one certain way of achieving that end—namely, to obtain for Germany supreme power in the world: it must dominate all neighbors as the only sure alternative to being dominated by them. The attack on Russia provides the final proof that this is the Nazi objective.

The people who say that Hitler could impose his will upon this country only by landing armies and fighting upon its soil show themselves blind to the nature of Nazi strategy. Quite apart from the fact that Nazi forces in great numbers have already firmly established themselves on the soil of the United States, and have been busy for a long time with subversive agitation—creating within the country the same kind of bitter division and internecine conflict which proved so useful to the Nazi plan in France, slowing up defensive preparation, and keeping alive moral hesitations which cripple policy and delay action until it may be too late—quite apart from all this, the fall of Britain would place in Hitler's hands an instrument of blackmail for use against the United States more potent than any he has previously wielded.

Britain having fallen, the first step of the Nazis would of course be the creation in London of a puppet "Vichy" government, composed of a few British Lavals and Darlans. The first step of such a Nazi-dominated government would be the arrest and imprisonment of Churchill and his Labor colleagues. Such a government, if only as a means of securing the best terms in the way of food for the British population, would from the first begin to curry favor with Berlin, just as Marshal Pétain's government has done; the British Vichy would prove what the French Vichy has proved, that submission to Hitler means in the end virtual alliance with him for the promotion of his further purposes.

And Hitler would have infinitely greater power of pressure and blackmail over a conquered Britain than he has had over a conquered France. Because Britain was still fighting when France surrendered and might have made use of a rebellious French population, France had to be treated with a certain gentleness. But there would be no active power in the background ready to help the British population if it should attempt revolt, and this population, moreover, would be dependent for the food needed to keep itself alive upon the conqueror's permission to ships to enter the ports. The British people, once conquered, would face not merely shortage, a gradual tightening of their belts, as in France, but stark famine, of Russian and Chinese intensity. Hitler knows that if he kept the British harbors closed for a month and crippled a few railroads, the children and the old people would begin falling dead in the streets of the cities.

This situation would give to Hitler the opportunity for a supreme act of blackmail, not only against Britain but also *against the United States*. He would say, in effect, to the United States: "The British fleet, or much of it, has fled to the harbors of the United States and Canada. Unless it is delivered to me, the harbors of Britain, now under my command, will be closed to every ship save German ships carrying supplies to the German armed forces. The British people will get no food from overseas until this gross violation of neutrality on America's part is corrected. If the British people suffer, it will be due to the action of the United States." He might, indeed, add to the proclamation a rider saying that the scuttling of British warships by their crews would involve "grave punishment" for the families and relatives of the officers and men concerned—a technique repeatedly employed by the Nazi government since it came to power.

What would the United States do? Let Hitler starve the British people or surrender the ships and with them, perhaps, the hope of holding command of the sea? By this strategy Hitler would have placed an immense humanitarian argument in the hands of his friends in the United States. All those who favored striking a bargain with him and his New Order would be able to argue that their course of appeasement was demanded by the need of saving the very life of the British people.

It must be remembered that the British cable service, the press, all the means by which the people of Britain get news of the outside world would be in German hands. Into France a good deal of news from Britain trickles by radio, by leaflets carried by planes, and by other means. Britain could be shut off from America far more completely than France can now be shut off from Britain. What the bulk of the British people knew of the situation above suggested would be just about what the Nazi government allowed them to know. British ignorance of the facts would go far to paralyze British action against the Nazis when the dispute about food ships arose. If within one year it has been possible for German maneuvers to bring about a nightmare situation in which a French navy can be brought to fight Britain, Hitler most certainly can hope that by similar methods he will be able to use a British navy, British naval bases, the resources of a world-wide British Empire, to prevent America from capturing command of the sea and to retain it for himself; and by so doing to shape the world to his purposes.

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When Americans saw naval power being used to effect a thorough political and economic penetration of Latin America, the sure encirclement of the United States, the disintegration of its democratic foundations, they would then insist upon resistance, as the people of Britain insisted when Poland was invaded. But it would then be very late. Resistance then would be very difficult, and many would wonder why it had not been offered earlier when it would have been so much easier to resist effectively.

Russia's Chances

BY ALEXANDER KIRALFY

EXCEPT in the secret files of Moscow—and possibly Berlin—no data exist sufficient to warrant the attempt to form a sound opinion of the war value of the Red Army. Even if such data were available, they might very well prove misleading. For it is quite as necessary to understand Stalin's military problems and to know how his divisions fight as to count the number of his tanks and bombers. Conceivably the Soviet armies could measure up to those of the Nazis in training and equipment, and yet go down to defeat. Or they could be significantly weaker, and still put a severe strain upon the German war machine. Russian success or failure will depend upon how Moscow reacts to enemy attack, and the attack and the reaction may both be appraised by following the moves of the opponents upon the maps appearing in the daily newspapers. Provided always, however, that the simple rules of the Nazi war book be understood.

The geography of the board upon which these movements are taking place considerably favors the Nazi system of offensive fighting. From the Arctic to the Black Sea there are no nearby points that the Germans *must* hold. Hitler can concentrate upon attacking. The Soviets are in a different situation. The need to protect the Karelian and Baltic approaches to Leningrad, the wheatfields of the Ukraine, and the Black Sea route to the Caucasus may tempt Stalin to thin out his forces. Except on the Polish front, Soviet counter-attacks would reach a series of dead ends—in northern Norway, Finland, East Prussia, or the Balkans. The defense of the highway to Berlin through the Polish flat lands is automatically furnished by Nazi offensives now under way.

These are the offensives that will disclose the ability of the Red staff and the capabilities of its troops, the quality and amount of their equipment, and the efficiency of their communications. The Kremlin must know how to turn Nazi methods to its own use. Echoing, in a 1940 tempo, the flank and rear attacks of all successful campaigns, the Nazi theories of war are extremely simple, and it would seem more profitable to review them in their application to the new war front than to list the names of strange towns and speculate whether the defenders can hold out and what is likely to happen next.

The term "pincer movement" does not tell the full story about Nazi methods. It announces the enveloping stabs without indicating the scientific forms they assume. As the German Admiralty has subdivided the adjacent seas into small, numbered squares, so the military authorities have mentally cut up the Soviet Union into a series of triangles. These begin at the frontier and stretch, mosaic-like, toward Moscow and other vital Soviet centers. The diagrams are translated into reality upon the battlefield. Against a front strongly held in depth, such as the trench system of the First World War and the Maginot lines of today, one or two German columns drive into the enemy line to form a triangular wedge or salient. Simultaneously a similar drive is launched a few miles farther along the front. The hostile forces between the two salients are then surrounded, and the result is German mastery of a large "bulge." This operation is duplicated at a still greater distance from the original points of entry, and the two large bulges or salient-triangles are merged into one of yet more ambitious proportions. In this manner the maximum number of enemy divisions is destroyed, and vast territories are overrun by attacks against a few points. The fewer and deeper the wedges pointing toward Moscow or other large Russian towns, the weaker, we must conclude, is Stalin's armed defense. On the other hand, if the invaders find it necessary to push numerous small dents into the Soviet front, it may be concluded that the defenders have compelled Nazi respect. When and if the front takes on a very "choppy" aspect, it can probably be assumed that the Soviet "Maginot line" has been reached.

Against troop formations unsheltered by fortifications, the dive-bombers and mechanized columns can thrust more widely spaced, narrower, and deeper triangles into the enemy's lines. This triangular type of advance was clearly defined during the early enemy moves into the Lowlands and France and reached an exaggerated form in the Nazi spurt from Sedan to Boulogne. Polish weakness was demonstrated by the wide, single pincer movement that severed the extensive Warsaw salient. The moment great weakness develops in the defending lines it is no longer

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necessary to have the pincer strokes converge. The spearheads are simply pushed ahead in pairs, mopping-up parties fulfilling their tasks in the intervening space. This was the method used in the Nazi attacks along the southern border of Poland in 1939 and during the final phases of the campaign in France. Whenever the war maps disclose such two-finger jabs, the obvious conclusion may be drawn—at least for that part of the front.

If the enemy boundary is a sinuous line with deep, ready-made indentations, the defensive weakness becomes evident. Not only does the Soviet border have such a configuration, but its salients are so near together that the "nipping" of one threatens the security of another. The seacoast, it may be noted, forms one face of a war triangle when the adjoining territory is under fire. Such a sea-washed salient extends from Leningrad to East Prussia. By striking toward Vilna or Kaunas the Nazis threaten this triangle. If overcome, the defenders must fall back quickly or lay down their arms. A "Dunkirk" cannot be carried out in the Baltic.

The Grodno salient, just south of the Baltic states, is jeopardized from Vilna in the north as it is from the south by the push-through at Brest-Litovsk; this explains the German assault upon those towns. Next comes the oblong Lwow salient, into which the Nazis drove on the left toward Brody and on the right, from northern Bessarabia, in the direction of Cernauti. Between the Lwow and Grodno salients lie the Pripet Marshes. By "nipping" the adjacent wedges the invaders would automatically menace the flanks of the Soviet troops fighting with their backs to the swamps. From the central Rumanian zone, pincer thrusts could envelop the Red divisions whose left flank rests upon the Black Sea.

The conflict along the Nazi-Soviet front having opened along strictly triangular lines, little difficulty should be experienced in keeping track of present and future movements. It may safely be prophesied that the German invaders will not attack "all along the line" or develop full-scale operations against the points of the triangles. They will, of course, make the usual "holding attacks," such as seem to have occurred at Przemysl, intended to keep the Soviet troops inside the triangles while these are being closed. Frequently such engagements may seem to be the "real thing," but with a little patience one should discover that after the heavy artillery bombardments or air bombings there is no follow-through.

To counter these moves the Red Army has two alternatives. One is to use similar tactics against the enemy, as from the outer part of the Grodno salient toward Warsaw and beyond. A companion drive from Przemysl would complete the "squeeze" upon the Nazis. Activity around this town could be explained on this basis. The question would be: Who is attacking? The other Russian move would be to "pinch the pincers," that is, permit the Nazi columns to make a certain amount of headway and then whip out against their flanks. In France and Belgium, because of equipment deficiencies, the Allied armies failed in such attempts. The manner in which the Nazi armored columns trying to "nip" the Grodno and Lwow salients were attacked from Vilna and Brody would seem to be evidence that Moscow is placing reliance on this type of operation. Reports of aerial bombardments of positions ahead of but to the right and left of the German spearheads would suggest the presence of hostile anti-pincer concentrations. Such Soviet units would probably pivot on the deep "Maginot line" they are believed to have constructed. In the breaching of such fortifications along narrow fronts the Nazis are adept, and the blasting of one or two lanes is enough to cause serious inconvenience to a wide fortified zone. Such positions are considered to be no stronger than the number of troops they can risk for counter-attacking. The Soviets may combine the fortress counter-attack with anti-pincer movements.

As the days roll by, the anti-pincer moves made by the Soviets and such pincer operations as they may conduct will present a better picture of the capacity of the Red Army than incomplete data on numbers and equipment.

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Movies to Sell the Reich

BY THOMAS DECKER

IN NEW YORK, Philadelphia, Chicago, and Los Angeles, in dozens of theaters throughout the country, Hitler's propaganda service is daily influencing people and making new friends. Through the medium of skilfully produced feature films and newsreels German-American citizens are being reminded of the ties of *Blut und Erde* (blood and earth) which link them with the Fatherland, and an *Einheitsfront* (united front) of Nazi sympathizers and dupes is being consolidated.

Against this latest development in German propaganda technique American producers and theater owners are raging impotently. The federal and local authorities seem powerless—or else unwilling—to curtail the right of the Third Reich to import celluloid propaganda, even though American films have been banned throughout Nazi-held Europe. Thus the exploits of the Luftwaffe and the *Panzerdivisionen* are being exhibited to heiling audiences estimated at hundreds of thousands weekly. Admission prices are low, ranging from 20 to 40 cents. The German government is not interested in making money. It is seeking a long-term profit by infiltrating its doctrines into the minds of movie patrons.

Now running at a Yorkville theater in New York City is "Sieg im Westen" ("Victory in the West"), produced under the auspices of the German High Command. It depicts the terrible scenes of Hitler's conquest of the Western democracies and obviously seeks to drive home to Americans the futility of resistance to the invincible German army and to impress upon them the inevitable triumph of the German "New Order." Not long ago another Nazi film, "Blitzkrieg im Westen," was shown to 2,000 Harvard students as a kind of mass-psychology test organized by the anti-fascist Harvard Student Liberal Union. Dr. Gordon Willard, professor of psychology, made this analysis of its emotional effect:

> The theme of the film is one of irresistible onrush shots taken from dive-bombers and tanks, actual battle scenes, but never, never a dead body. One sees always German successes, and the moral that resistance is hopeless. In the final scenes of the armistice, every ounce of melodramatic revenge is wrung from the scene. In a dictatorship, the whole man is not appealed to, only the excitable part.

Nazi films are also used to promote racial dissension in this country. Several months ago attempts were made to import from Brazil the anti-Jewish film "The Eternal Jew." This film had been sent to South America on an Italian ship and actually shown in public. Prompt action has forestalled its showing here, but it is on the waiting list—awaiting a "favorable" turn of events. German releases received in advance describe it adequately.

> Never before has there been shown a political movie with such success. "The Eternal Jew" is not a feature film but a documentary film about world Jewry, which it pictures coolly and objectively in reportorial fashion. Most Germans know Jews only as civilized Western Europeans who moved in all social circles. They are hardly acquainted with the original Jews of the Polish ghettos, whence came a steady stream of immigrants to the cultural West and especially to Germany.

"Irische Tragödie" ("Irish Tragedy") is an attempt to win over Irish Americans. It "portrays the courageous sacrifices by Irish patriots in their struggle for freedom." The German Library of Information bulletin, *Facts in Review,* gave a two-page summary of the film. An Irish peasant—"one of the multitude whom British Volunteers robbed and murdered"—is shown being dragged away from his home by brutal English police carrying rifles. In another scene three Irish "patriots" are walking "through the prison gates for the last time." Like "The Eternal Jew" this film is on the waiting list.

Not content with urging attendance at German movies, German officials also try to sabotage American productions, which they term "Jewish." Acting upon orders from Berlin, heads of Nazi transmission belts here have forbidden their members to attend American theaters showing "The Great Dictator," "Pastor Hall," "The Confessions of a Nazi Spy," and other films critical of the Nazi regime. The boycott has reached dangerous proportions in Chicago. Pressure by pro-Nazi "German voting blocs," including the voters of the German-American Alliance, the Bund, the Patriotic Research Bureau (Mrs. Elizabeth Dilling's organization), and other groups, has been sufficient to induce the local police department and Mayor Kelly to exclude "Pastor Hall" from a showing there. Unbelievable as it may seem, German voting blocs in certain parts of the city also succeeded in stopping the presentation of "The Confessions of a Nazi Spy." Police gave the lame reason that the film incited the audience to riot and racial prejudice. The police, however, did nothing to ban the Nazi propaganda film "Der Feldzug in Polen."

Nazi pressure groups are being consolidated throughout the country. Their leaders demand that wherever German movies are shown, the theater owners live up fully to the requirements of the Nazi propaganda office.

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The contract which must be signed includes a stipulation that the scenes exhibited "will not be edited, arranged, published, exploited, or advertised in a manner that will tend to injure or reflect adversely upon the said picture in whole or in part, or upon the country of origin of said picture . . . or upon any nations friendly toward the country of origin of such picture."

The sole distributor of Nazi films in New York is the Universum Film Aktiengesellschaft (UFA), an American subsidiary of the great German film monopoly. It releases approximately 50 newsreels and 120 short subjects a year. This firm apparently is not directly affected by the recent closure of Nazi consulates and agencies. But it will be deprived of the services of Herr Hirschfeld, of the consular staff, who edited and supervised all productions, and of the assistance of the German Library of Information in promoting private showings. UFA strictly enforces its "block-booking" policy in accordance with a decree issued April 30, 1940, by the head of the Reich's Film Department, and published in *Der Deutsche Film,* trade paper of the German motion-picture industry. The decree provides that "*Kultur* films of political value" and a newsreel must be shown together, "in order to give all racial comrades an opportunity to participate in the happenings of the present."

The case of the Ninety-sixth Street Theater suggests that the Nazis are willing to find capital to increase the outlets for their pictures. A short time ago this theater was losing money rapidly, but as it was about to close up, aid came suddenly from sources as yet unrevealed but easily imaginable. It then began to spend large sums for advertising in the Bundist *Deutscher Weckruf und Beobachter,* and undertook a direct campaign by mail for patronage. Its managers, Willie Mansbacher and Walter Bibo, are once again "in the money."

At least eight public moving-picture houses provide outlets for German films in Greater New York. In Chicago first-run propaganda pictures are shown simultaneously with their appearance in New York. Chicago is regarded as more fertile ground for Nazism than New York because of its German-American voting bloc and the political concessions of Mayor Kelly to the *Einheitsfront.* Other cities where the Third Reich is regularly glorified on the screen in theaters open to the public are San Francisco, St. Paul, and Milwaukee. In many other places private shows arranged by private organizations friendly to the Nazis have been reported. In Boston, for instance, the Christian Front recently gathered a large audience of zealous Coughlinites to view "Sieg im Westen" and hear a long speech by Francis P. Moran, Front leader in New England, who urged mothers in the audience to write their sons in the army and "impress upon them the impossibility of any nation's defeating the German army."

Germany's ban on American films was explained by Fritz Hippler, head of the Propaganda Ministry's Film Section, as follows: "Germany's prohibition of American movies is justified as a necessity forced on us by America and demanded by our national honor and political self-defense. . . . Germans are happy that the American film industry by this prohibition has been deprived of 40 per cent of its income from foreign countries."

The Independent Theater Owners' Association, composed of the owners of 350 independent theaters in the New York metropolitan area, plans to meet this summer and pass a resolution demanding that the State Department ban Axis propaganda films in retaliation for the German ban. More than 9,000 theater owners are pledged to back the resolution. The association is not opposed to the showing of foreign films. It states in its resolution that "the major problem is to prevent the spread of Nazi and Fascist propaganda and also the raising of money here to be used . . . against Britain and its allies." In many cities locals of the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving Picture Machine Operators are planning to work for legislation forbidding members of its union to project German-made films before audiences in this country. Nazi strategists intend to circumvent this by showing their films in German halls and operating the projecting machines themselves.

In the Wind

THE CHANGE in Communist policy is bound to include, in practice at least, a new line on labor and defense. After Munich, when the party demanded an armament program larger than that advocated by the Administration, Communist leaders pledged to expose those who in any way hampered munitions production. In a speech made during the Popular Front days, Earl Browder said: "If there should arise in America anything similar to the situation in Spain [he was referring to the P. O. U. M. incident], then we, like our brothers of the Spanish Communist Party, would be in the forefront of the struggle to suppress such extremists, who are really agents of fascism, and render them harmless."

IN RECENT SPEECHES Karl J. Alter, Catholic Bishop of Toledo, has praised the Pétain and Franco regimes, condemned "tyranny by a majority," and described artificial birth control as incompatible with the "American way of life."

TEX McCRARY, editor of the New York *Daily Mirror,* may soon break with his boss, William Randolph Hearst. McCrary has been won over to the interventionist position, and his editorials frequently stray from the Hearst line.

THE TOWNSEND MOVEMENT convention, which will be held this month in Buffalo, is likely to be split wide open by the question of aid to Britain. Dr. Townsend and his personal followers favor the government's foreign policy, but a rank-and-file group that may prove a majority is strongly isolationist.

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A Native at Large

BY JONATHAN DANIELS

Coordinating the Coordinators

THE old man ran a store at a crossroads which was already in the throes of becoming a camp. The camp in his back yard was the first one he had seen grow, but the confusion which disturbed him, the uncertainties of the farmers whose land was being taken and of the village people whose rooms were being jammed, repeated the conditions under which camps had grown in other places six months before. Sometimes there was awareness that the same human problems had been encountered before, but it seemed to show itself only in the confusion of more people.

"Well," said the old man, "we've got coordinators, cooperators, and cohabitators, and it's hard to tell which does the most harm."

There has been plenty of talk since the defense program began about the jurisdictional strikes of labor unions. The President, sometime ago, spoke about that himself. There is beginning to be more talk about the contests between government agencies, military and naval brass hats, dollar-a-year men, and the like in Washington, contests which amount to jurisdictional strikes on a larger scale in the government itself. One commentator recently said that the President's method of trying to solve administrative chaos is to pile up new agencies and assistants—also and especially "coordinators"—on top of old ones without removing the debris. The confusion is audible in Washington, but when it hits the country, and particularly the rural countryside where once you could almost hear the corn grow, there is a babel which makes more noise than the nickelodeons and probably does more damage than the girls.

Confusion over more important things, like materials and priorities, contracts and subletting, will probably get most stress, but some little, even trivial things may be more symptomatic. There was the health officer I heard blowing off the other day because he feared that his malaria-drainage project was threatened by the intervention of an official of another agency disturbed because the drainage planned to protect the soldiers might help make the ivory-billed woodpecker extinct. There was the recreation official complaining with great restraint that theaters on military posts have been built with stages too small for theatrical performances.

Those are details, undoubtedly, in a vast planning which has already resulted in a vast building. And they are details connected with the health and happiness of men actually in service, who properly get the most attention. Outside reservation gates, where civilians have crowded to serve soldiers or to work in arms factories, almost anything can happen and almost everything has. The flophouses have been steadily ahead of the public housers. The patent-medicine salesmen have been on hand before the designs for health facilities arrived. The juke joints had been going full blast for months when the United Service Organizations began their campaign to make the soldiers happy.

These things concern people, and maybe they are not as important as the frustrated demands for materials. They may seem less important in a mechanized world. Many people feel that it is no time to worry about welfare when we have our hands full with preparing for possible war. Unfortunately, however, the confusion is the same and comes from the same source.

None of this is any secret in Washington. "It gets so sometimes," one of the President's most devoted officials told me, "that you can't tell who is giving whom the runaround."

I remember a story told by a very able young man who has an important place now on the charts which run down from Mr. Big to the tool-maker. A few years ago, he said, he had been a minor official in a Middle Western state capital. It was a Democratic administration, but one popular official who was a Republican told the young man that he was going home to run for governor and he knew he was going to win. "I'm going to run on the Confusion ticket," he said. "It has the most people behind it."

The young man, now in Washington, smiled. "I wrote him the other day. He's a colonel down at Camp Shelby in Mississippi now. I told him to come on up here; we're making bigger and better confusion."

I hope it will not last. The young man was trying in Washington in an important field to help create sense and order. But the place to see the Washington situation is where its officials, through their representatives, converge on defense towns and meet each other in surprise in the midst of confusion. A storekeeper at a crossroads transformed into a crowded defense community can see it. Congressmen are hearing about it. In a good many places people are cussing about it. The first priority in defense should be coordination, but there should be fewer coordinators.

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BOOKS *and the* ARTS

The Empire of Angria

THE BRONTES' WEB OF CHILDHOOD. By Fannie Elizabeth Ratchford. Columbia University Press. $3.50.

WHEN Mrs. Gaskell was preparing her life of Charlotte Brontë, she was given access to the immense mass of Brontë juvenilia, but the little manuscript books were difficult to read, and Mrs. Gaskell's examination was cursory; she found them of no significance. Later a large part of the canon was bought by T. J. Wise, but that astute bibliographer found no value in it and sold all except a few items. C. K. Shorter, the author of the definitive Brontë biography, judged the material to be of small importance. Now, after nearly twenty years of arduous research, Miss Ratchford is able to give the full history of the little books; it is one of the most interesting stories I have ever read.

In 1826 Branwell Brontë, then nine years old, received from his father a particularly fine set of wooden soldiers. He allowed each of his three sisters to choose a favorite, and he himself selected one. Under a variety of names these soldiers became the heroes of a continuous communal story. As the Brontës grew older, their tales of physical adventure developed into novels of social conflict and individual passion. The empire of Angria was established in Africa; here the children set up dynasties, built cities, arranged royal marriages, directed wars and revolutions; they founded publishing houses and periodicals and wrote the histories, romances, and poems so complex a civilization would need.

This great precocious game did not end with childhood; indeed, its power over the players seemed to grow with the years: the game became for them a living reality. When Emily left home she did not pine because she was separated from her family but because she was deprived of her Gondals —for she, with the gentle and less gifted Anne had seceded from the Angrian cycle—and when Charlotte was away from Haworth it was for Angria that she yearned. Emily was a notable poet as well as a novelist of genius; her poems, as we now learn, were written for the Gondal chronicles; and the great passions of "Wuthering Heights" had ultimately the same source. All the character-types and many of the situations of Charlotte's novels had occupied her long before "Jane Eyre" startled the world. Branwell, who supplied the Angrian material upon which Charlotte worked, was creating Angrian history well into his young manhood.

Miss Ratchford tells this story—and it is far more fascinatingly complex than I can briefly indicate—with a taste and skill that almost match her scholarly pertinacity. But even though she speaks with the authority of a unique knowledge, I cannot agree with some of her interpretations.

One thing that troubles me is her treatment of Branwell. He is not, of course, an attractive person; his shiftless, graceless—perhaps insane—life was part of his sisters' tragedy. But the moral scorn with which Miss Ratchford speaks of him is, to say the least, inappropriate. She can barely mention his name without anger; she finds it contemptible that he should be involved with Angria at seventeen, though she speaks complacently enough of Charlotte's Angrian preoccupation at twenty-three; she can describe as "good-natured" Charlotte's satirical portrait of her brother, no doubt an accurate enough sketch but certainly one of the cruelest imaginable. It is, of course, clearly within the rights of a literary investigator to decide to solve no problems in psychological motivation; it is not incumbent upon Miss Ratchford to consider what makes an adolescent boy turn to village debauchery, or what part in his ruin his father may have had (Miss Ratchford barely mentions this remarkable man, though he has a clear connection with the dominant males Emily and Charlotte loved to create), or what the brother's decline owed to his conflict with the obvious superiority of his gifted sisters. But it seems to me that if a literary investigator abstains from these matters she ought also to abstain from moral judgments unenlightened by such considerations.

I find, too, an incomplete insight in the thesis Miss Ratchford advances about Charlotte's relation to the Angrian stories. She speaks of the modern tendency to prefer Emily's work to Charlotte's and says that it is based on ignorance of the fact that the genius of the two sisters was "identical" and that "Emily's one point of superiority was her full surrender to the creative spirit which Charlotte fought with all the strength of her tyrannical conscience." Quite apart from the oddness of the implication that a taste is invalidated by ignorance of a fact, and apart from the oddness of finding any two geniuses "identical," Miss Ratchford's statement is, on its face, not acceptable. For why should Charlotte fight the creative spirit? Her training did not suggest the necessity; quite the contrary. Miss Ratchford quotes a letter from Charlotte on the sin of "idolatry," but this is ambiguous and need not mean, as Miss Ratchford says, the sin of worshiping the Angrian creatures of her imagination. It seems much more reasonable to suppose that Charlotte, even if she herself believed that she was fighting the creative spirit, was actually fighting what the creative spirit expressed—that is, her desires as embodied in her fierce Byronic Angrians.

For it seems to me that Miss Ratchford is right in finding that the degree of "surrender" makes the difference between the work of the sisters; not, however, surrender to creativity but to emotion. And the difference it makes is not one of literary talent—the sisters' gifts were equal—but of moral and emotional atmosphere. Emily "surrenders" to the masculinity of her men and the femininity of her women and keeps them distinct; the result in "Wuthering Heights" is a wonderful freedom and openness of feeling. Charlotte, however, is ambivalent; she does not "surrender," she compromises—and continues to struggle. She had always adored the Byronic Rochester-type, but Jane Eyre cannot give herself to Rochester until he is blinded, crippled, and dependent on her. And in Jane Eyre herself Charlotte incorporates both male and female elements—Jane speaks explicitly of her identity with Rochester—and the result is a tension of anger and rebellion, very interesting, even admirable, but also disquieting;

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the self-adulation of Jane Eyre suggests an
ity, and behind her righteousness we suspec

But Miss Ratchford's interpretations oc
small part of her book; they do not dimini
or its fascination. To the extensive liter
Brontë family it is a contribution of preemir
it is also one of the few books that may legit
in the psychological study of literary genius.

LION

The Double War

WAR BY REVOLUTION. By Francis Williams. The Viking Press. $1.50.

DEMOCRACY'S BATTLE. By Francis Williams. The Viking Press. $2.75.

A FAITH TO FIGHT FOR. By John Strachey. Random House. $1.75.

IF FRESH proof were needed that the war is in reality a world-wide civil war, the current fighting in Syria would be that proof. There Frenchman fights Frenchman for the liberation of France from Berlin and Vichy. Nationality is no longer the test of a man's allegiance. A doctrine, a concept of the world, is becoming the bond between brave and far-seeing men. Why that is so, Mr. Williams explains in these two books. The tactical and strategical outline of the war, the framework of its action, may at present be defined by geography; yet already the war is producing its strange anomalies. In order to liberate France the two governments, of Britain and Free France, have promised total national freedom to what is virtually a part of the French Empire: are the De Gaulle troops, then, consciously and exclusively fighting in the interests of empire?

The main outline of the thesis summarized in the words "the war on two fronts" is now sufficiently familiar. Mr. Williams's two books, however, possess some of those special merits which a new presentation of the thesis demands. He argues the case with singular lucidity and persuasiveness of style, and to a certain extent he conceives anew its entire philosophy. I mean that he does not merely give a democratic slant to views originally propounded by Communists, nor is there in his writing any evidence of interior strain, such as there is in Mr. Strachey's disappointing effort. Mr. Strachey, indeed, does not appear to have thought out his problems afresh; he has merely taken a new approach to them. Justly angry, and unnecessarily embittered with the Communists, Mr. Strachey now pleads socialism as the expression in society of the concepts of truth and love. Gone is the Struggle for Power. There is no bridge, one perceives, between these two intellectual worlds. So that when Mr. Strachey discusses the U. S. S. R. he does so with obscurity, uneasy deference, and, one feels, a sort of nervous and rather fearful hope.

Mr. Williams does not recognize the need for a bridge, fortunately, and so writes confidently and with robust maturity. He does not dedicate himself to passionate indecision. He states emphatically that the war is "the climax of a process, social and international, to which there are two possible answers—the dark answer of the totalitarians or the bright and hopeful answer of a new democracy vastly different from

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and action, of revolution merely a vague united-front broadening of the old worn-out, inapplicable doctrine of class struggle, which, by the way, does not lead so much to a struggle of classes as to a vendetta between parties and factions within parties.

Mr. Williams, I think, would have been well advised to include in his book two other historical examinations. He should have analyzed and compared the Spanish Republican government's conduct of its war against fascism with that of the present government in Britain. For Britain must do better even than the country which has provided by far the best political lesson. To produce within the British working class the violent hatred and factional strife that existed in Spain is unnecessary and probably impossible. But the British people must penetrate the Spanish mythology also; it was in part factional strife rising out of theoretical differences, as well as exhaustion, which put an end to the Negrín government. Yet it was the social policy of that government which in great measure, though not exclusively, maintained morale for so long in spite of the lack of arms and equipment. However, the important point is that Spanish Popular Front democracy was neither strict republican democracy nor pure revolution. It was, in fact, the Spanish peasant and proletarian revolutionary counterblow to fascism, modified, and so checked, by a policy originating from a party whose principal interest in it was first a defense service to the U. S. S. R. and then power over the Spanish revolution itself. (That policy temporarily conflicted very little with the larger interest of the Spanish people, I believe.) Now in Britain no such opportunity exists, because the reactionary classes have not risen against a constitutional government. The Labor Party must push forward social demands which will create a dynamic morale in the masses, but at no time must it shatter the necessary degree of unity which is the condition of resistance. The outbreak of the Russo-German war has not changed this problem.

And secondly Mr. Williams would have done well, in his chapter on the necessity of releasing revolutionary effort in

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…lone and would be inclined to disclaim this …ection. But no Norwegian can disagree with …'s main thesis. The farmer and the fisherman, …nd the industrialist, the teacher and the civil …ailor and the ship-owner were sharing the re… and benefits of a progressive, civilized com… …t degree hardly surpassed anywhere else.

…arriman makes it clear that these benefits were not …r the asking. They had to be fought for and were …t for. People now ask whether they should not also be …ght for in a military sense. At the time of the invasion of Norway foreigners received the impression that Norway was not ready to fight in that sense. Mrs. Harriman, one of the rare foreigners who really knew the Norwegian people, kills that legend. Her story of the City of Flint episode makes it clear that the neutrality of Norway before the invasion was no abject neutrality. Her account of the invasion shows that the Norwegians did not take it lying down. For two months a small nation kept the Nazi forces fully engaged, and for more than a year now it has kept a large force engaged by its passive resistance. It is no mean service to the Allied cause. Without the democratic progress of the preceding years Norway might not have stood up so well. A greater military defense establishment acquired at the expense of that progress might not have assured so great a service to the cause. Nations much better equipped have gone down under the Nazi juggernaut, and more swiftly.

But Mrs. Harriman does not set out to establish this or any thesis. It emerges from her story. She is herself content to tell what she saw. She enjoyed Oslo and the people she met there. She went skiing. She liked the royal family. She shared the dangers and discomforts of the invasion. She accompanied Crown Princess Martha to this country. Some of her story will be source material for the historian; some of it will be useful to the political scientist, the economist, and the sociologist. All of it is meat for the passionate democrat.

BJARNE BRAATOY

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MISSION TO THE NOR… . By Florence Jaffray Harriman. J. B. Lippincott Company. $3.50.

THIS is a book that is faithful to its title. Mrs. Harriman tells the story of her mission as United States Minister to Norway from 1936 to 1940. And she tells it as a story. Like a good reporter she does not ask her reader to go elsewhere to find the background of her story or to supplement it. An introductory chapter describes the atmosphere from which she was uprooted for, as she calls it in her second chapter, her "unexpected mission." Other chapters tell of visits to Sweden, of an excursion to Leningrad and Moscow, and finally of her hurried departure via Sweden and Finland. But the burden of the story is Norway.

With impressive honesty Mrs. Harriman abstains from injecting into her story of the first peaceful years in Norway any of those forebodings which are reported with such ease by those who like to demonstrate their wisdom and foresight after the event. She clearly set out to become acquainted with the people of Norway, a full-time job in itself. It is a comparatively minor matter that she exerted herself to learn the language. It is much more important that she was not content to know only the capital and the people at the so-called center of things. She went into the country. Not as a tourist. No tourist would venture north of the Arctic Circle in the fishing season and join the seething turmoil of men and boats bringing in the fish. Her chapter We Fish for Cod must be read to be believed. Here is a diplomat who really is a democrat. She has evidently studied the machinery of Norwegian political and economic life, but she learned most from men and women in all walks of life and in all parts of the country.

She performs a real service to the cause for which so many of us are today fighting by showing the Norwegian way of life before the invasion of the Nazis. We need faith, and knowledge to fortify our faith, that the democratic way is a successful and efficient way of promoting human welfare. She gives us proof in a chapter headed Pulling Together. A Norwegian might react unfavorably to the chapter entitled Ahead of Us All, for Norwegians are concerned about what

PUBLISHED THIS WEEK

PUBLIC POLICY AND THE GENERAL WELFARE. By Charles A. Beard. Farrar and Rinehart. $1.50.

THE NEW CENTRALIZATION. A Study of Intergovernmental Relationships in the United States. By George C. S. Benson. Farrar and Rinehart. $1.50.

GREAT RIVER OF THE MOUNTAINS: THE HUDSON. Photographs and Prose by Croswell Bowen. Introduction by Carl Carmer. Hastings House. $3.75.

BOMBER'S MOON. By Negley Farson. Harcourt, Brace. $2.

FATHER OF THE BLUES. An Autobiography of W. C. Handy. Macmillan. $3.

THE SOUTH SEAS IN THE MODERN WORLD. By Felix M. Keesing. John Day. $3.50.

FROM LUTHER TO HITLER. By William Montgomery McGovern. Houghton Mifflin. $4.

RUSSIA. By Bernard Pares. Penguin. 25 cents.

ADMINISTRATION AND THE RULE OF LAW. By J. Roland Pennock. Farrar and Rinehart. $1.50.

SMASH HITLER'S INTERNATIONAL. The Strategy of a Political Offensive Against the Axis. By Edmond Taylor, Edgar Snow, and Eliot Janeway. Greystone. $1.

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d with Miss Houston's group of
lian Voodoo songs. As for the con-
ng concert, it demonstrated the
apparent impossibility of putting small bands like Zutty Singleton's and "Hot Lips" Page's on a stage with the intention of having them play with relaxed improvisatory freedom, and not having this intention defeated by the self-consciousness and over-stimulation that such occasions seem to produce in the musicians, causing a drummer like Singleton to make as much noise or a trumpeter like Page to blow as many loud high notes as he can. For the rest there were Billie Holiday, with her excessively mannered style, the Palmer Brothers, of whom I enjoyed the droll brother second from the right, and the master of ceremonies that seems—very wrongly, it always turns out—to be considered indispensable for a jazz concert.

The marvelous "Blues of Israel" recorded by Jess Stacy and a few others of the 1935 Benny Goodman Orchestra with the extraordinary young Negro Israel Crosby on bass, is on 18114 of the second Decca Jems of Jazz album (201, $3.50) of records made here several years ago for English Parlophone. The same group plays with exciting vitality in "Three Little Words" (18114), "The Last Round-up," and "Jazz Me Blues" (18115), and Stacy, Crosby, and Krupa are excellent in "Barrelhouse" (18119), with two of Beiderbecke's negligible piano compositions played by Stacy on the reverse side. A group that includes Bunny Berrigan, Eddie Miller, and Cliff Jackson contributes a fine "Blues" and a good "I'm Coming, Virginia" (18116), and is good also in "You Took Advantage of Me" and "Chicken and Waffles" (18117). And another group that includes Pete Brown, Benny Carter, Joe Marsala, and Billy Kyle is moderately enjoyable in "Ocean Motion" and "Tempo di Jump" (18118). The writer of the accompanying booklet informs us that he organized the Pete Brown recording-session for Parlophone, but does not mention the man who was responsible for the best performances in these two albums. But this constitutes admirably generous behavior in that world apart in which the attitude toward a band that someone else has discovered or a concert or recording-session that someone else has organized is likely to be, very simply, "it stinks."

Performances on recent jazz records that I have liked are the Duke Ellington-Jimmy Blanton duet "Mr. J. B. Blues" (Victor 27406), the amusing Basie Orchestra "Undecided Blues" (Okeh 6071), and Joe Sullivan's solos "Forevermore" and "Del Mar Rag" (Commodore 538). Good also are the Ellington Orchestra's "Take the 'A' Train" (Victor 27380), and the Joe Sullivan-Pee Wee Russell-Zutty Singleton "Last Time I Saw Chicago" (Commodore 537), which has some terrible African jungle stuff called "Three Deuces" on the reverse side. And Jess Stacy's piano-playing is enjoyable in the Bob Crosby Orchestra's "Burnin' the Candle at Both Ends" (Decca 3694). In the John Kirby album (Columbia C-45, $2.50) I have liked "Sweet Georgia Brown" (36001) and "Coquette" (35999, in which the solo-playing is freeest in style and best; the polished performances of arrangements and the jazz versions of classics I don't care for.

The cheap records that are being sold at various prices by mail-order houses and all kinds of retail stores, under a number of labels and in one case under pretentious auspices, should be bought with great caution. B. H. HAGGIN

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contemporary manners; Volume I to a series of *rapportages*, including an amiable one of Kansas by J. W. McManigal and a bitter one of the migratory worker by Dorothea Lange. No distinctly new trends seem to have developed during the year, and though a good deal of space is devoted to color, a method of reproduction capable of doing full justice to either a first-rate transparency or a first-rate carbro print is still a long way off. A fine series of black-and-whites taken in the seventies by Henry Jackson, first man to photograph the Yellowstone and other Western regions, illustrates the fact that though the scope of photography has immeasurably widened, the best pictures taken half a century or more ago are, even technically, as good as the best taken today.

LET MY PEOPLE GO. The Story of the Underground Railroad and the Growth of the Abolition Movement. By Henrietta Buckmaster. Harper and Brothers. $3.50.

Had Miss Buckmaster lived in the era of which she writes she undoubtedly would have been in the front rank of Abolitionists. Her bibliography is of impressive proportions, and her researches are evidently vast; but hers is not the zeal of the impartial student. It is that of the reformer and humanitarian. Coupled with her vivid realization of the thoughts and feelings of others and her talent for retelling what she has gleaned, it has produced a volume to sweep the reader off his feet. Authenticated in every detail, it lacks only the perception that the South also had a point of view to make it a work of great distinction.

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